Open, Closed, and Social Dominance
Determinants of Political Ideology and Economic Ideology
In how social science applies to politics, there is a set of personality constructs used for measuring differences; originating in FFM, OCEAN, HEXACO, etc. The main one is the liberal-minded trait ‘openness to experience’, sometimes with a secondary related trait of ‘intellect’ that is split off. On the opposite side, there is the conservative-minded trait ‘conscientiousness’, along with similar facets like ‘need for closure’; particularly in terms of sociopolitical conservatism (SPC).
But ‘conscientiousness’ isn’t as predictable as is ‘openness’. That is to say there are more liberals who are high in both ‘openness’ and ‘conscientiousness’ than there are conservatives high in both. The main trait of ‘openness’ will tend to trump ‘conscientiousness’. For example, it’s low ‘openness’ and not high ‘conscientiousness’ that is the link between sociopolitical conservatism and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA).
This is why some researchers have prioritized ‘openness’ and, instead of using ‘conscientiousness’, refer to a general ‘closed’ disposition (C.D. Johnston, H.G. Lavine, & C.M. Federico, Open Versus Closed). The ‘closed’ trait can incorporate ‘conscientiousness’, but is mostly defined as low ‘openness’. It’s closer to the ‘need for closure’ that measures low in those high in ‘openness’. But there is one further complication.
The framework of ‘open’ and ‘closed is mostly determinative of social, cultural, and political issues. Whereas economics is not so straightforward. That is because economics, as we’d argue, likely has more to do with social dominance orientation (SDO): dominance hierarchies (SDO-D) and anti-egalitarianism (SDO-E). SDO also overlaps with dark personality (Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, sadism).
The standard SPC and RWA is distinct from the SDO measure, in that they can just as easily be low as high on it. The dark personality SDOs are a different phenomenon that has more to do with economics than with the sociopolitical. It’s for this reason that the right-wing versus left-wing dichotomy would be more easily be measured by SDO, whereas the conservative as SPC follows the aforementioned ‘closed’ versus ‘open’.
This means one can have a liberal or illiberal leftist, with something similar on the political right. We all know of the illiberal right-winger, what Bob Altemeyer calls Double Highs (high RWA + high SDO), often found in far right groups and movements, particularly among the leaders. Whereas a standard moderate conservative would more likely be relatively lower SDO and more middling on RWA, meaning that they are a bit more liberal-minded while not necessarily being egalitarian but not necessarily anti-egalitarian either.
Many Democratic leaders are some combination of neoliberals (SDO-E as vertical individualism) and neocons (SDO-D as vertical collectivism), but overall not likely measuring anywhere near as high on SDO as Republican leaders. Plus, typically measuring a bit higher on ‘openness’, these mild SDOs are going to have more social liberalism, if no where near as much as left-liberals like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Mild SDOs (or those high only on SDO-E, not SDO-D) are fine with diversity, as long as there is a somewhat orderly dominance hierarchy: capitalist realism, competitive individualism, paternalism, plutocracy, permanent underclass, etc.
Anyway, this is why there is so much confusion. The Democratic Party isn’t left-wing but simply moderate liberalism and moderate social dominance, with some RWA among certain demographics in the base (e.g., the poor and minorities with higher rates of fundamentalist religiosity). While the Republican Party is extreme anti-liberalism (SPC+RWA) and extreme social dominance, with a particular penchant for the overt oppressiveness and old school bigotry of SDO-D. This means , at least as compared to .
The American political system, obviously, is not defined by strong support for egalitarianism and opposition to dominance hierarchies; if the two parties vary in degree, form, and preference within SDO. This is where it’s much harder to figure out how economic views fit into the mix. The abovementioned researchers Johnston, Lavine, and Federico — in their book Open Versus Closed — attempted to disentangle the factors. They argue that the evidence demonstrates a dual relationship between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ dispositions on one hand and economic leftism and economic conservatism on the other.
In entirely ignoring SDO, they use the metric of political engagement, high versus low, to determine this relationship. But they do so as a proxy measure for other things. The basis of their approach is that political engagement influences whether one acts according to operational ideology (e.g., pragmatic self-interest or group-interest) or symbolic ideology (e.g., partisanship and elite influence). Those highly engaged who are high openness tend to support free markets (admittedly, a vague concept, as many neoliberals and neo-fascists conflate it with corporatism), whereas those highly engaged who are low openness prefer government intervention in the economy. The pattern is reversed for the less engaged.
This explains why the hardcore politicized MAGA evangelical hates the welfare state, as it has become a symbolic issue and hence political football used by elites to manipulate them, mixed up with racist dog whistles (e.g., welfare queens). It’s irrelevant if they would personally benefit or not, since operational ideology has been obscured behind the Machiavellianism of elite rhetoric. This is why they vote against their own interests. These people are simply lost in the master narratives of the right-wing noise machine, as controlled by the high SDO dark personalities and Double High far right leaders.
But for the largely disengaged fundamentalists in the Democratic party, they’re more likely to realize that the welfare state is to their benefit and to the benefit of their family and community. In not following news, pundits, and influencers, they know little and care even less about party elites and so they’re simply driven by operational ideology (i.e., real world problems and everyday concerns). They might be as high in RWA as the average MAGA type, but their RWA hasn’t been activated and organized by the Machiavellian manipulations of high SDOs and Double Highs. Nor has their religiosity been politicized and weaponized as culture war and moral panic.
We might make some qualifications, though. How American politics have been polarized likely has little to nothing to do with the politics of many other countries, specifically in the West. The United States is a highly unequal banana republic with plutocratic corporatism. The pattern would likely differ greatly not only in countries that aren’t WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) but also in WEIRD countries that are egalitarian social democracies (e.g., Scandinavia). High inequality distorts everything. It’s too bad we don’t have more and better research outside of the United States.
