Trump’s Ukrainian Nobel Prize Bid
Will the POTUS Play With the Idea of Negotiating With Russia?
The 2021 ultimatum
On December 17th, 2021, just a few months before the regrettable events in Ukraine unfolded, the Russian Federation proposed a list of security guarantees to the US and NATO. Viewed by Russia as a “draft of a treaty” and by Western allies as a “list of demands and an ultimatum,” the document’s most controversial proposals included the removal of NATO troops and weapons from countries that had joined the alliance after 1997 (namely Poland, the Baltics, and the Balkan countries), and a stipulation that there would be no further NATO expansion, including, of course, Ukraine. The document, with all its demands, was rejected by the US and its NATO allies on January 26th, and the rest is history.
When the proposal was published, some argued that accepting Russia’s demands would result in a new international world order, comparable to the one established at the Yalta Conference in 1945 by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, even though the comparison between the two is very loose, since, for example, in 1945 the Nazis were the former enemy, and this time there is no such entity on the political stage.
Unthinkable in 2021, but does the newly elected President of the United States, Donald Trump, think otherwise? With his promise to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours of taking office unfulfilled, President Trump has been exploring various options to resolve the conflict, essentially from (and perhaps even before) the first day of his second term. He sought to forcefully bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table, stating that if Ukraine refused, he would stop supporting it, and if Russia refused, he would impose even more sanctions and send additional weapons to Ukraine. This reflects his unique businessman approach to “making deals” — a scenario in which all parties are satisfied, though, in this case, not entirely.
Just a hypothesis…
The above leads to the following hypothesis: given Trump’s continued failed attempts to end the war in Ukraine and the elusive possibility of receiving a Nobel Peace Prize (which would certainly be well-deserved, if it were to occur), is the President considering “striking a deal” with Russia based on President Putin’s 2021 “proposals”?
The art of the deal
It is clear that not all of Russia’s demands will be met. For instance, NATO effectively returning to its 1997 borders is inconceivable unless the President of the United States seeks the disintegration of the Alliance. However, the idea of Ukraine never joining NATO, withdrawing short- and medium-range missiles from the region, and establishing a direct communication line between Moscow and NATO could serve as a solid foundation for constructing a new security order in Europe. While this would not align with the new international security order that President Putin ostensibly seeks through his demands, it could at least ensure peace — albeit likely not fully stable — in Ukraine.
In this scenario, the war-torn country would be able to continue its integration into the European Union, although, regrettably, it would probably not be in its entirety. Ukraine would most likely have to relinquish territories in Donbas and Crimea, a concession that, after President Zelenskyy’s recent statements following Trump’s inauguration, seems increasingly plausible. Even today, in front of the Guardian, the Ukrainian President admitted that he would trade territory with Russia, stating that the ground occupied by the Ukrainians in Kursk could be exchanged for some (non-specified) land occupied by Russia in the Donbas.
And what about the Europeans?!
A valid question that arises is: where do the Europeans stand in all of this? In this scenario, they are conspicuously absent from the negotiating table. The trilateral talks between the US, Russia, and Ukraine suggest a deliberate exclusion of the EU from the conversation, which would deal a severe blow to the Union’s standing as a global actor. Today’s article in Reuters, which reports the US urging its European allies to purchase more weapons from them, could be seen as a precursor to this shift in dynamics.
If such an outcome were to occur, all parties, except for the current U.S. administration, would be left with a bittersweet result. Russia would not be able to annex all of Ukraine’s territory, but it could still claim victory. Ukraine would lose around 20% of its land but would be able to proclaim a victory for democracy over autocracy. The country’s leadership could then steer the remaining population toward almost certain EU integration, potentially becoming the 28th member of the Union. And, of course, Yalta or not, President Trump would secure his Nobel Peace Prize.
