Natasha Tusikov: The Right to Repair Is Vital to National Security and Sovereignty
The right to repair is about the freedom to take apart, modify and fix software-enabled devices.
With the United States quickly descending into authoritarianism under President Donald Trump, it should now be evident to policy makers that the right to repair — the freedom of buyers to choose who fixes their goods — is critical to national security and sovereignty. Canada is currently facing a with its planned purchase of US-manufactured F-35 fighter jets. With Trump’s repeated threats to annex Canada, as well as to the sovereignty of Greenland and Ukraine, countries including have begun to consider alternatives to US military equipment, including replacing the F-35s with aircraft manufactured in Europe.
The key issue for the F-35s is that the US manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, controls aircraft software updates, restricting even trained military personnel from making most repairs, which means that the military often must ship the equipment back to the manufacturer or authorized repair depots. In , the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) criticized the US military’s heavy reliance on contractors for F-35 repair and maintenance, which has resulted in lengthy and costly delays, with repair times averaging 141 days. The GAO concluded that US military repairers often lacked the training and hands-on experience to repair the aircraft. This is largely because the primary manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, along with other military contractors, provides inadequate training materials, limits the repairs that military technicians can undertake and restricts access to the aircraft technical data, which the contractors regard as unique and valuable proprietary data.
The case of the F-35s highlights that even the US military does not have the right to repair its equipment, as manufacturers set restrictive warranty provisions that limit repair by military personnel. In relation to consumer goods, the right to repair is about the freedom to take apart, modify and fix software-enabled devices, either by oneself or using an independent repair shop, with original equipment manufacturers making the necessary spare parts, tools, repair manuals and diagnostic software available for reasonable prices. For industrial goods such as fighter jets, this right would require manufacturers to provide trained military (or civilian) personnel with the manuals and software necessary to fix the aircraft.
However, even if Lockheed Martin and other US military contractors allowed government repairers to fix military equipment, the larger problem is that the United States is no longer a trusted ally. Having already threatened the sovereignty of multiple countries, Trump could conceivably pressure US military contractors to disable the functionality of the F-35s, as defence analysts warn that US control over Canada’s future F-35s is a . Widespread media discussions of a “kill switch” for the F-35s, which the manufacturer denies, have exacerbated worries. The nature of networked software controlled by product manufacturers makes such a switch unnecessary, as the F-35 is “not just an aircraft, it’s a ” that is “dependent on software-driven upgrades for mission success.” For countries outside the United States, the vulnerability is about “U.S. control over the jet’s .” In short, control over software enables control over hardware, and that control is in the hands of the United States.
The F-35 case is rightly forcing policy makers to consider the vulnerabilities of networked software in highly complex military equipment. But there are also sovereignty implications of manufacturer-imposed restrictions on repair in more mundane areas, such as , including transportation networks. In spring 2022, for instance, a Polish train manufacturer used digital locks embedded in the trains’ software to prevent the trains from being restarted after routine maintenance by an independent repair company. The trains were inoperable until the repair company hired to remove the digital locks, enabling the trains to function normally again. Public- or private-sector operators of digital infrastructure need the autonomy to choose how and by whom repairs will be undertaken, as opposed to being at the whims of manufacturers’ commercial interests. The train manufacturer’s million-euro against the hackers may make independent repair companies reluctant to take on certain jobs.
Easing restrictions on repair also makes economic sense, particularly as the United States is threatening to impose further punitive economic tariffs on Canadian products; choosing Canadian-owned repair businesses keeps money and jobs in local communities. Keeping repair local also makes sense for Canada’s rural and remote communities, as repair disproportionately affects people living outside major population centres who may have to travel long distances to access manufacturer-authorized repair shops or acquire parts.
Canada has already taken concrete steps toward a right to repair by its Copyright Act in November 2024. These amendments allow repairers to legally break manufacturer-imposed digital locks in device software to diagnose and fix many types of consumer goods. Further steps are needed to make repair more accessible to businesses and people who don’t have the technical skills to break these locks themselves. Provincial governments, for example, should take steps to prevent manufacturers from voiding warranties when customers choose independent repairers — a step has already taken.
More broadly, policy makers need to initiate a wide-ranging discussion across multiple industry sectors about the security and economic implications of manufacturers — and hostile states — controlling access to products’ networked software.
The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
is an associate professor of criminology in the Department of Social Science at York University and a visiting fellow with the School of Regulation and Global Governance (RegNet) at the Australian National University.
